第13部分(第1/7 頁)

will　be　tightly　held　toserve　the　prince　with　fidelity；　inasmuch　as　they　know　it　to　be　verynecessary　for　them　to　cancel　by　deeds　the　bad　impression　which　he　hadformed　of　them；　and　thus　the　prince　always　extracts　more　profit　fromthem　than　from　those　who；　serving　him　in　too　much　security；　may　neglecthis　affairs。　And　since　the　matter　demands　it；　I　must　not　fail　to　warn　aprince；　who　by　means　of　secret　favours　has　acquired　a　new　state；　that　hemust　well　consider　the　reasons　which　induced　those　to　favour　him　who　didso；　and　if　it　be　not　a　natural　affection　towards　him；　but　onlydiscontent　with　their　government；　then　he　will　only　keep　them　friendlywith　great　trouble　and　difficulty；　for　it　will　be　impossible　to　satisfythem。　And　weighing　well　the　reasons　for　this　in　those　examples　which　canbe　taken　from　ancient　and　modern　affairs；　we　shall　find　that　it　iseasier　for　the　prince　to　make　friends　of　those　men　who　were　contentedunder　the　former　government；　and　are　therefore　his　enemies；　than　ofthose　who；　being　discontented　with　it；　were　favourable　to　him　andencouraged　him　to　seize　it。6。　It　has　been　a　custom　with　princes；　in　order　to　hold　their　states　moresecurely；　to　build　fortresses　that　may　serve　as　a　bridle　and　bit　tothose　who　might　design　to　work　against　them；　and　as　a　place　of　refugefrom　a　first　attack。　I　praise　this　system　because　it　has　been　made　useof　formerly。　Notwithstanding　that；　Messer　Nicolo　Vitelli　in　our　timeshas　been　seen　to　demolish　two　fortresses　in　Citta　di　Castello　so　that　hemight　keep　that　state；　Guidubaldo；　Duke　of　Urbino；　on　returning　to　hisdominion；　whence　he　had　been　driven　by　Cesare　Borgia；　razed　to　thefoundations　all　the　fortresses　in　that　province；　and　considered　thatwithout　them　it　would　be　more　difficult　to　lose　it；　the　Bentivoglioreturning　to　Bologna　cam