第11部分(第2/7 頁)

ion　only　a　few　of

them；　giving　prominence　to　such　as　have　a　reference　to　the　object　of　our　history。　The　error　which

first　meets　us　is　the　direct　contradictory　of　our　principle　that　the　state　presents　the　realisation　of

Freedom；　the　opinion；　viz。；　that　man　is　free　by　nature；　but　that　in　society；　in　the　State　…　to　which

nevertheless　he　is　irresistibly　impelled　…　he　must　limit　this　natural　freedom。　That　man　is　free　by

Nature　is　quite　correct　in　one　sense；　viz。；　that　he　is　so　according　to　the　Idea　of　Humanity；　but　we

imply　thereby　that　lie　is　such　only　in　virtue　of　his　destiny　…　that　he　has　an　undeveloped　power　to

bee　such；　for　the　〃Nature〃　of　an　object　is　exactly　synonymous　with　its　〃Idea。〃　But　the　view　in

question　imports　more　than　this。　When　man　is　spoken　of　as　〃free　by　Nature；〃　the　mode　of　his

existence　as　well　as　his　destiny　is　implied。　His　merely　natural　and　primary　condition　is　intended。　In

this　sense　a　〃state　of　Nature〃　is　assumed　in　which　mankind　at　large　are　in　the　possession　of　their

natural　rights　with　the　unconstrained　exercise　and　enjoyment　of　their　freedom。　This　assumption　is

not　indeed　raised　to　the　dignity　of　the　historical　fact；　it　would　indeed　be　difficult；　were　the　attempt

seriously　made；　to　point　out　any　such　condition　as　actually　existing；　or　as　having　ever　occurred。

Examples　of　a　savage　state　of　life　can　be　pointed　out；　but　they　are　marked　by　brutal　passions　and

deeds　of　violence；　while；　however　rude　and　simple　their　conditions；　they　involve　social

arrangements　which　（to　use　the　mon　phrase）　restrain　freedom。　That　assumption　is　one　of

those　nebulous　images　which　theory　produces；　an　idea　which　it　cannot　avoid　originating；　but　which